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Abstract 
We investigate the impact of state ownership on the innovativeness of firms, as measured 
by the number, quality, and value of the patents produced. In a sample of listed European 
firms, we find that minority government ownership increases investment in research and 
development, especially for financially constrained firms and during “normal” 
macroeconomic conditions. Yet, government control leads to the opposite effect, by 
imposing myopic goals and complicating access to private equity markets. Overall, state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) produce fewer patents per dollar invested and about 10% fewer 
patents in absolute terms. When comparing SOE patents to private-sector patents, we find 
no difference in patent quality as measured by the number of citations received per patent 
or by the market reaction at patent publication. Furthermore, we find no increase in the 
number of patents focused on sustainable technologies, suggesting that SOEs do not 
emphasize innovation that produces public goods or social spillovers.  
(JEL G32, G15, G38) 
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1. Innovation at state owned enterprises 
 
The past two decades have seen both an increase in government ownership of firms, following a 
previous wave of privatizations in western markets, and substantial changes in the dominant type 
of state ownership model.1 In contrast to the old model of state-led entrepreneurship, in which the 
state owned and ran sprawling industrial conglomerates and monopolistic national champions, 
today the most common incarnation of government ownership is the holding of minority stakes in 
publicly traded firms (Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009; Megginson and Fotak, 2015). The impact of 
government stakes on publicly traded firms has accordingly attracted substantial interest.2 We 
investigate the impact of state ownership on an aspect of corporate behavior that has so far been 
ignored by the literature on government ownership: the innovativeness of firms. Our aim is to 
explore how government ownership affects investment in research and development (R&D), the 
R&D efficiency of firms, and the ultimate output of the R&D process, as measured by the number, 
quality, and value of patents generated by the firm.  
There are various ways in which government ownership could affect the investment in 
innovation by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). First, extant literature emphasizes the lack of 
incentives for SOE managers, which could lead to under-exertion of effort and excessive risk-
aversion.3  This “quiet life” channel would imply a lower level of effort in general, and lower levels 
of investment in risky activities such as R&D. In addition, government ownership could impose 
short-term social and political goals (Kahan and Rock, 2010; Shleifer, 1998), such as the support 
of high levels of employment that divert firm resources away from investments with a long-term 
payoff, such as R&D. This “myopic government” channel also implies a lower level of investment 
in R&D.    
On the other side, there are well-documented constraints on investment in R&D that 
government ownership could help relax. First, extant research on innovation finds that managerial 
risk-aversion and short-termism (due to pressures from investors) lead to underinvestment in R&D 
                                                          
1 Borisova et al. (2015) report that, “contrary to public perceptions and despite the worldwide success of 
state privatizations, from 2003 to 2013 governments have acquired more assets through stock purchases 
($1.52 trillion) than they have sold through privatizations ($1.48 trillion).” 
2 Dewenter, Han, and Malatesta (2010), Kotter and Lel (2011), Knill, Lee, and Mauck (2012), and 
Bortolotti, Fotak, and Megginson (2015) discuss the impact of a prototypical type of sovereign minority 
investor, the sovereign wealth fund, on firm behavior and valuation. Borisova et al. (2015) investigate the 
impact of government shareholding on the cost of debt of publicly traded firms.  
3 Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar (2013) examine the role of state ownership in corporate risk-taking, using 
evidence from privatizations. They find strong and robust evidence that state ownership is negatively 
related to corporate risk-taking. 
(Lerner and Hall, 2010). The long investment horizons of governments and the stable availability 
of financing provided by state-owned banks allow state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to focus on long-
term projects, including R&D, providing insulation from short-term market pressure. In short, 
while there is a risk that governments impose their own short-term, myopic goals, privileged access 
to finance for SOEs might relax short-term pressures from the financial sector. Second, the high 
opacity and long-horizon of R&D investment lead to well-documented underfunding. Government 
ownership, by providing implicit debt guarantees and access to state owned banks, could relax 
financial constraints and allow for larger investment in R&D.4 Yet, government ownership is 
potentially a double-edged sword, as it could also increase financial constraints of firms by 
preventing access to equity markets.5 Third, Arrow (1951) and Debreu (1959) find that private 
agents underinvest in goods that produce high levels of social-benefit spillover and have low 
commercial value, as they are unable to fully internalize the benefits of such investments. 
Accordingly, privately held firms underinvest in technology (Arrow, 1962; Lerner and Hall, 2010). 
Yet, governments and affiliated SOEs share some of those social goals and are thus better posed to 
internalize the benefits produced by innovation. This would imply higher levels of investment in 
R&D, with a particular bias towards innovation with social spillover. 
The above arguments point to conflicting predictions in regards to the relation between 
government ownership and R&D investment. Our empirical analysis aims at shedding light on the 
issue—yet, we are only able to document the predominant, net effect. On the other side, extant 
literature documents that government-owned and mixed-ownership firms are less efficient than 
private enterprises, due to conflicting objectives (Kahan and Rock, 2010; Shleifer, 1998), lower 
managerial incentives (Borisova et al., 2012), and politicians extracting rents from firms, either to 
                                                          
4 O’Hara and Shaw (1990), Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006), Borisova and Megginson (2011), 
Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi (2013), Acharya, Anginer, and Warburton (2016), and Borisova et al. (2015) all 
find that government ownership leads to implicit debt guarantees, which lower the cost of capital of state 
owned enterprises.  
5 Stulz (2005) shows that firms subject to the “twin agency” problems, where the threat of insider 
expropriation is compounded by that of government expropriation, face a higher cost of capital. Ben-Nasr, 
Boubakri, and Cosset (2012) find government ownership to be associated with a higher cost of equity due to 
the threat of political interference. Chen, Wang, Li, Sun, Tong (2015) find that SOEs underprice IPOs more 
than private-sector firms, suggesting difficulties in rising equity capital. D’Souza and Nash (2017) find that 
listed firms with majority government ownership face agency problems (due to conflicting priorities of the 
government and minority shareholders) that hinder access to foreign capital markets. Jiang, Lee, and Yue 
(2010) and Cheung, Rau, Stouraitis (2010) find evidence of government owners extracting rents from 
minority investors.  
 
reward supporters or themselves (Jiang, Lee, and Yue, 2010; Cheung, Rau, Stouraitis, 2010).6 
Hence, we expect government shareholding to lead to lower efficiency. To investigate this issue, 
we test whether government ownership is associated with fewer patents per unit of invested capital. 
Lower efficiency could manifest not only in a lower patent count per unit of capital invested, but 
also in patents of lower quality. Accordingly, we aim at testing whether government ownership is 
associated not only with the sheer number of patents produced, but also with the quality of the 
patents—which we proxy, as in extant literature, by the number of citations received from other 
patent filings. 
In empirical analysis, we focus on a sample of publicly traded European state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), including firms that majority-, and minority-owned by governments. We adopt 
here a broad definition of the term “state-owned enterprise” encompassing every firm with a 
domestic government stake greater than zero, even if such stake is a small minority holding. We 
restrict our analysis to European firms to benefit from a uniform intellectual-property regime (so 
to allow for comparability in the number of patents registered by firms), while still benefitting from 
a wide range of ownership structures. We obtain data on government ownership from the BvD 
Orbis database for the years spanning 1999 to 2016. We define a firm as a “state-owned enterprise” 
(SOE) if the government owns any share of voting rights in the firm. Aside from a binary indicator 
variable identifying the presence of a government shareholder, we further construct a continuous 
variable identifying the total size of the stake owned by the government, both direct and indirect. 
We restrict our analysis to domestic government ownership and focus on firms headquartered in 
one of the twenty-eight countries that are member of the European Union as of December 2016.7 
We analyze publicly listed firms so that we can obtain data on research and development 
expenditures, as well as other financial data from Thomson Reuter’s Worldscope database. Finally, 
we obtain data on patents from the European patent office’s (EPO) PATSTAT database. Our 
sample covers 5,171 firms, of which 1,363 are SOEs, and 3,808 have no government ownership at 
any point in our sample (“non-SOEs”). Of the government-owned firms, 291 have an average 
                                                          
6 Extant privatization finds that the efficiency of state-owned enterprises increases post-privatization. The 
early literature on privatizations is surveyed by Megginson and Netter (2001) and Djankov and Murrell 
(2002). More recent evidence includes Sun and Tong(2003), Boubakri, Cosset and Guedhami (2005), and 
Estrin, et al. (2009), among others. Empirical evidence of inefficiency in mixed-ownership enterprises is 
provided by Eckel and Vermaelen (1986), Boardman and Vining (1989), and Chen, Firth and Xu (2008). 
Borisova, Brockman, Salas, and Zagorchev (2012) document that ownership by central and local 
governments is associated with worse corporate governance. 
7 While we include all twenty-eight countries in our data filter, we find usable observations for firms in 
twenty-six countries only. Further detail on the distribution by country is presented in Table 2. 
government stake exceeding fifty percent, while the rest (1,072) have minority government 
ownership stakes. 
Our final sample contains 34,192 firm-years with complete data. Of those, 30,384 are non-
SOEs while 3,358 are SOEs, with average government ownership of 6.83%. Univariate statistics 
reveal important differences. SOEs are larger (greater total assets), more profitable (higher ROA) 
and display greater leverage. We exclude financials from our sample. The SOE sample is more 
heavily tilted towards manufacturing, while the sample of non-SOE firms has a higher fraction of 
service firms. As expected, the fraction of transportation firms and public utilities is also higher in 
the SOE sample. Due to those differences in industrial distribution, we control for industry-level 
characteristics with industry (and industry-year, where feasible) fixed effects, except when 
including firm fixed effects. More importantly, SOEs display a larger investment in R&D when 
scaled by size, at 2.29% of total assets, compared to 1.86% for private-sector firms. SOEs are also 
much larger on average. Hence, the absolute dollar investment in R&D by SOEs is almost three 
times as large as for non-SOEs (USD 13.6 million vs. USD 5.2 million). This translates into a 
higher number of patents for SOEs: the mean number of patents per year is 9.25 for SOEs, vs. 5.01 
for the non-SOE sample. SOE patents receive about the same number of citation per patent (0.06-
0.07). Overall, the comparison reveals that SOEs invest substantially greater amounts in research 
and development (both as a proportion of total assets, but especially in absolute terms) and 
consequently generate a higher number of patents. Yet, the increase in R&D for SOEs is relatively 
greater than the resulting increase in patent count, pointing to lower efficiency of the R&D process, 
or a lower count of patents “per dollar of R&D.”  
We investigate more formally the relationship between R&D expenditure, as a proportion 
of total assets, and government ownership in a multivariate regression setting. We control for 
country-year and industry-year fixed effects, but also for time-variant firm characteristics. We find 
that the presence of a government shareholder is associated with greater R&D expenditure. The 
results are both statistically and economically significant, with the presence of a government 
shareholder increasing investment in R&D by about 5.55% (while the increase is estimated at 0.1% 
of total assets, the average R&D expenditure for firms in our sample is about 1.8% percent of total 
assets). Yet, when we control for the size of the stake owned by the government shareholder, we 
find more nuanced results. While the presence of a government shareholder is associated with a 
higher expenditure in R&D, a large, controlling stake is associated with a decline in R&D 
expenditure. Our results are consistent with the conjecture that the presence of a government 
shareholder encourages expenditure in R&D by providing access to cheap external funding, 
presumably via state-owned banks, while a controlling government stake leads to the imposition of 
myopic, short-term goals similar to Shleifer (1998).  
To further investigate this interpretation, we add to our models variables identifying 
financially constrained firms and firm-years affected by financial crises—and interactions of these 
variables with metrics of government ownership and control. We use an indicator variable based 
on the Laeven and Valencia (2013) dataset to identify financial crises at the country-year level. We 
identify financially constrained firms by computing the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) (HP) index for 
each firm, at a yearly frequency. We find that the increase in R&D investment associated with the 
presence of a government shareholder is even stronger in capital constrained firms, consistent with 
the hypothesis that the presence of a government shareholder relaxes financial constraints. Further 
supporting this interpretation, we find that the effect is weaker during a financial crisis, as state-
owned banks are likely to face other priorities and funding constraints during times of macro-
economic distress. On the other side, the interaction between firm-level financial constraints and 
government control points to an additional decline in R&D expenditures. This result suggests that 
government control (as opposed to government minority ownership) increases financial constraints, 
presumably by discouraging access to equity capital markets. This is consistent with a large 
literature that documents that equity issuances by government-controlled firms are slower, more 
complex, and more expensive processes that a simple seasoned equity offering by a private-sector 
firm, leading to a higher cost of private-sector equity capital (Ben-Nasr, Boubakri, and Cosset, 
2012; Chen et al., 2015;  D’Souza and Nash, 2017).  
Clearly, one of the challenges in our setting lies in the fact that government ownership is 
not random—and even the univariate statistics indicate that SOEs tend to be larger, more profitable, 
and more highly levered. This leaves open the potential for confounding effects due to omitted 
variable biases induced by unobservable firm characteristics. Accordingly, in robustness tests, we 
first re-estimate the same regression models with firm fixed effects, to control for time-invariant 
unobservable firm characteristics. We find that our main findings regarding government presence 
and control are unaffected. On the other side, we do not find significance in the interaction between 
measures of firm-level financial constraints and government ownership, possibly due to the low 
variation in time after absorbing cross-sectional difference with firm fixed effects.  
As an additional test, we employ a two-stage model to control for the possibly endogenous 
nature of government ownership, mimicking the approach by Borisova et al. (2015). In the first 
stage, we instrument government ownership and control using variables that have been found to be 
related with government ownership, but which are unlikely to affect firm-level R&D expenditures 
directly: political orientation of the ruling executive (left vs. right-wing), an identifier for civil-law 
legal systems, the level of investment in the country, scaled by GDP, and the country-level 
unemployment rate. Once more, we confirm our main findings. 
Yet, we are interested, ultimately, in innovation output. Accordingly, we similarly analyze 
the relationship between the number of patents produced by a firm, scaled by the amount invested 
in R&D, and government ownership. In a multivariate setting, we analyze the impact of patent 
production over varying time horizons (from one to three years), while controlling for industry-
year and country-year fixed effects, but also for time-variant firm characteristics. We find that the 
presence of a government shareholder is negatively related to the number of patents produced by 
SOEs over the following years. Our results point to a 10.2% decrease in the production of patents 
scaled by R&D expenditure. However, government control (as opposed to simply minority 
ownership) does not appear to affect the efficiency of intellectual property production.  These 
results are robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects.   
Given that our main findings indicate an increase in R&D expenditure (at least for firms 
with minority government ownership and during non-crises periods), but a decrease in research 
efficiency (fewer patents per dollar invested in R&D), the net impact on firm innovativeness is a 
matter ripe for empirical analysis. Accordingly, we re-estimate similar regression specifications 
with the number of patents (or log of the number of patents) per firm-year as a response variable. 
Overall, we find that the presence of a government shareholder is associated with a 10% decline in 
the number of patents. The effect is, however, weaker (approximately a 3% decline) in financially 
constrained firms, as those appear to benefit from a greater investment in R&D thanks to access to 
capital via state-owned banks. These results, as before, are robust to the inclusion of firm fixed 
effects.  
Given that governments have different goals than private-sector shareholders, we 
hypothesize that government ownership could affect not only R&D investment and the quantity of 
innovation but also the quality of innovation. Extant literature finds that one of the reasons for 
underinvestment in innovation by private-sector actors is the inability to fully internalize the value 
of a technological breakthrough. Early-stage technologies are the ones that provide the most 
technological spillover—and whose value is the hardest to fully internalize. Early-stage patents 
would likely generate higher citation counts, as they lead to derived inventions. On the other side, 
government ownership might lead to inefficiencies that, in turn, lead to investment in low-impact 
innovations. Such low-impact innovation could be associated with a low citation count. Given such 
conflicting predictions, we investigate the impact of government ownership and control on the 
number of citations per patent produced. We regress the number of citations per patent per R&D 
dollar spent against variables identifying government ownership and control and the usual 
interactions with variables identifying financially constrained firms and financial crises.  After 
controlling for time-variant firm characteristics, country-year fixed effects, industry-year fixed 
effects, and in robustness tests firm fixed effects, we find no evidence of an impact of government 
ownership on the average citations per patent. This suggests that SOE patents do not differ in terms 
of quality from private-sector patents. 
Another indirect measure of patent quality is the commercial value of the patent itself. 
While we cannot observe patent value directly, similar to Kogan et al. (2017), we proxy its quality 
by measuring the stock price reaction of the patenting firm at the announcement of a patent’s 
application. If SOE patents are more oriented towards social, rather than commercial, objectives, 
then the average market reaction at announcement should be weaker, reflecting a lower patent 
commercial value. In a series of event studies, we find that the publication of a patent leads to an 
abnormal return of about 0.67% over the 21-day window surrounding the patent publication. In 
comparison, the related figure is 0.64% for the benchmark sample of private-sector patents. Tests 
for significance of the difference in abnormal returns reveal that the difference is not statistically 
significant, nor does it appear economically relevant. We find robust results over different event-
time windows. Overall, our results indicate that SOE patents have substantial commercial value, 
increasing firm valuation by approximately 0.67% at announcement, which is not different from 
the impact of private-sector patents.  
The different priorities of government owners, as compared to private-sector shareholders, 
could also lead to a greater focus on new technologies that can provide benefits to society at a large. 
Such technologies have value that cannot be fully captured by the commercial value of the patent. 
For that reason, socially beneficial technologies will likely be underfunded by the private sector. 
Governments, on the other hand, are in a position to prioritize patents with such high social value. 
We identify a set of “sustainable patents” related to technologies aimed at climate change 
mitigation and, in broader terms, related to clean energy sources. Our prior is that SOEs, given their 
greater concern for patents with social value, are more likely to pursue innovation aimed at such 
sustainable patents. Yet, in empirical tests, we find no significant relation between the presence of 
a government shareholder, the size of the stake owned by the government, nor government control 
and the number of sustainable patents produced by the firm. This confirms that government 
ownership does not affect the type of innovation pursued by the firm. Our manuscript contributes 
to two streams of the empirical corporate finance literature. A stream of recent papers examines the 
effect of government shareholding on listed firms (Dewenter, Han, and Malatesta, 2010; Kotter and 
Lel, 2011; Knill, Lee, and Mauck, 2012; Borisova and Megginson, 2011; Bortolotti, Fotak, and 
Megginson, 2015; Borisova et al., 2015). Within the literature on government ownership, we fill 
an important gap by showing that state ownership has a deleterious impact on innovativeness, 
despite the fact that it helps financially constrained firms obtain credit and increase R&D 
investment. While this result has been often predicted in theoretical discussion on state ownership, 
our manuscript is the first, to our knowledge, to provide robust empirical evidence in regards. This 
deleterious impact translates into a lower number of patents, both in absolute terms and scaled by 
the amount of funds invested in R&D. On the other side, we do not find evidence of an impact on 
patent quality (as measured by the number of cites) or commercial value (as measured by the market 
reaction at announcement). 
We also contribute to the growing literature on corporate innovativeness.  There are 
multiple works that examine firm characteristics that influence innovation such as firm boundaries 
(Seru, 2014), corporate governance (Meulbroek et al., 1990), and executive characteristics 
(Chemmanur et al., 2015).  A growing literature on the availability of financing suggests that while 
equity capital may be preferential for the funding of risky projects (Lerner and Hall, 2010), firm 
innovation output can still be influenced by the availability of access to debt markets (Amore et al., 
2013; Cornaggia et al., 2015).  If debt markets are indeed important for the financing of innovation, 
state ownership may provide another mechanisms for firms to access debt when traditional financial 
intermediaries fail to fund innovative activities.  Other works examine the role private institutional 
owners play in driving innovation.  Aghion et al. (2013) find that institutional owners encourage 
more innovation allowing managers to “swing for the fence” instead of encouraging myopic, short-
term decisions based on career concerns.  This is similar to the failure tolerant culture venture 
capitalist can create to spur innovative output (Tian and Wang, 2014).  While it is possible that 
sovereign owners may create a similar long-horizon culture within the firm, SOE’s balance other 
non-revenue maximizing objectives like job creation which may run counter to the results in 
Aghion et al. (2013). A large portion of the innovation literature focuses on intellectual property in 
the United States.  More recently, Ayyagari et al. (2011) examine innovation, broadly defined, in 
emerging economies and finds that new product lines and new technology development can be 
hampered by controlling state ownership. Cao et al (2016) find that state ownership improves 
innovative efficiency through the relaxation of financial constraints in Chinese owned firms.  
Similar to these latter studies, we examine investment and patenting efficiency outside the United 
States to take advantage of the diverse sovereign ownership in European firms. Accordingly, we 
examine firms across 26 countries which allows us to address endogenous concerns that may be 
driven by country specific effects and more broadly address the influence of state ownership on 
innovation and investment.       
 
 2. Data and univariate statistics 
In each of the sections below we describe the sources from which we draw our data.  In 
Table 1, we define the various variables used in the tests that follow and the data source used to 
create each variable. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the industry composition, country 
composition, full sample of firm-year observations, and univariate t-tests comparing firm 
characteristics for the SOE and non-SOE firms. 
 
2.1 Intellectual property 
Our patent data comes from two sources.  The initial patent information is taken from BvD 
Orbis, which provides granted patent data in addition to raw citation counts for each individual 
patent. BvD Orbis reports patents across 41 different patent offices and draws its patent information 
from the EPO’s PATSTAT database. BvD Orbis has disambiguated the patent information and thus 
provides a link between granted patents and firm accounting and ownership information.  We take 
the intellectual property data from BVD Orbis and aggregate the total number of granted patents 
across all European Patent Convention (EPC) member offices for each firm-year. As is custom in 
the literature, we use the year of application to associate the patent with its most likely time of 
invention, i.e. when the firm was most likely to expend effort and investment to produce the 
invention. While BvD Orbis provides raw citation data, it is important to adjust for citation 
truncation issues as noted in Hall et al. (2000). Because BvD Orbis only provides raw citation 
information, we also gather patent data from the EPO’s PATSTAT product.  PATSTAT contains 
patent applications and grant information for the EPC member offices and the European patent 
office in addition to citation data for each patent. Following Hall et al. (2000) and Levine et al. 
(2015) we calculate the citation truncation adjustment for each industry patent class (IPC) and grant 
lag of the citation distribution.8 We report the citation lag distribution for each IPC class in the 
appendix Table A1. Because we include patent counts and citations across different European 
patent offices, we calculate the citation truncation adjustment for multiple individual patent offices 
and perform a patent office specific truncation adjustment where there is enough data to form the 
citation lag distribution. Figure A1 compares the citation adjustment factor for industry patent 
classification (IPC) A: Human necessities across multiple patent offices. The coordinating 
                                                          
8 Similar to Levine et al. (2015) we estimate the citation lag distribution over a 30 year window for each 
grant year and patent class in the window 1976-1985.  We then average the citation lag distribution for each 
industry class over the 10 years to generate an average citation lag distribution for European patents.  
 
adjustment factors are reported in Table A2.  As shown in Figure A1 and Table A2, there is some 
significant heterogeneity in the citation accumulation timing across the different patent offices, 
necessitating office specific adjustments when possible.  When there is not enough time series 
information to generate an office specific truncation adjustment, we use the aggregate patent data 
across all EPC offices to generate an average citation lag distribution reported in Table A1.   
 
 
2.2 Sovereign ownership 
We obtain data on government ownership from the Bureau van Dijik Orbis database for 
the years spanning 1999 to 2016.9 We define a firm as a “state-owned enterprise” (SOE) if the 
government owns any share of voting rights in the firm. Aside from a binary indicator variable 
identifying the presence of a government shareholder, we further construct a continuous variable 
identifying the total size of the stake (as a proportion of voting rights) owned by the government. 
We restrict our analysis to domestic government ownership, direct or indirect. “Indirect” ownership 
is defined as ownership through controlled entities (any stake owned by an entity in which the 
government owned a majority of voting rights would be included in our definition of “government 
stake”). We focus on firms headquartered in one of the twenty-eight countries that are member of 
the European Union as of December 2016. We exclude financials and firms for which we have 
incomplete accounting data (as discussed in the following section). Our final sample covers 5,171 
firms, of which 1,363 have non-zero government ownership at some point during the time interval 
of interest, and 3,808 have no government ownership at any point in our sample. Of the 
government-owned firms, 291 have an average government stake exceeding 50%, while the rest 
(1,072) have minority government ownership stakes.  
In addition to data on government ownership, we obtain firm level primary SIC codes, to 
identify the main industry in which the firm operates, and a variable identifying the country of 
headquarters. We report the industrial distribution of the firms in our sample in Table 2, Panel A. 
Both SOEs and non-SOE samples contain a large proportion of manufacturing firms (46% of the 
SOE sample and 39% of the non-SOE sample) and firms in the service industry (21% and 30%). 
“Transportation and Public Utilities” constitute about 13.5% of the SOE sample and 9.5% of the 
                                                          
9 Our choice is restricted by data availability in the Orbis database. The version of the dataset we employ is 
via an online platform made available in the summer of 2016 as part of a transition to a new database 
(“Orbis historical”). It contains the data that was previously available only in CDs, including historical data 
for both listed and delisted firms. Data coverage prior to 1999 is available, but scarce—hence our choice of 
starting year.  
non-SOE sample, while “Retail Trade” and “Mining and Construction” each constitute about 10% 
of both the SOE and non-SOE sample. 
 
2.3 Accounting data 
We obtain financial data from Thomson Reuter’s Worldscope database. We match firms 
between Orbis and Worldscope by using International Securities Identification Numbers (ISINs), 
which are available in both datasets. All data is as of December 31 of the year of interest and in 
USD—at yearly frequency. We download metrics for firm size (total assets), profitability (return 
on assets), leverage (debt over total assets), capital expenditures, property plant and equipment, and 
investment in research and development. We further obtain dates of first addition in the database 
(as rough proxies for firm age) and dates of last updates. We drop all observations following the 
date of last update (as Worldscope stores the last available data for all subsequent years). All values 
are expressed in USD. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% tails, to mitigate the impact 
of outliers and bad data points. In the descriptive tables, we report numbers unadjusted for inflation; 
in empirical analysis, we adjust all monetary values to the base-year 2004, using the Consumer 
Price Index (Urban) data from the St. Louis Federal Reserve.  
In empirical analysis, we test whether government ownership relaxes financial constraints 
of firms. In order to identify financially constrained firms, we construct the Hadlock and Pierce 
(HP) index, as described by Hadlock and Pierce (2010). In particular, following their formula, we 
compute the index as: 
HP index = (-0.737 × Size) + (0.043 × Size2) – (0.040 × Age)                                            (1) 
Where Size is the log of inflation adjusted (to 2004, as in the original formulation) total 
assets, and age is the number of years the firm has been listed in the Worldscope database. As in 
the Hadlock and Pierce formulation, size is replaced with log ($4.5 billion) and age with 37 years, 
if the actual values exceed those thresholds. We further identify financially constrained firms as 
firms whose HP index is below median and construct a binary variable, Constrained, equal to 1 for 
every firm-year for which the HP index is below median, and 0 otherwise.  
 
2.4 Descriptive statistics 
Our final sample contains 34,192 firm-years with non-missing data. Of those, 30,848 are 
non-SOEs while 3,358 are SOEs (firms with a government stake greater than zero), with average 
government ownership of 6.83%. Approximately 4% of firms with government stakes are 
government controlled (with a government stake exceeding 50%). Univariate statistics, reported in 
Table 2, reveal important differences between the SOE and non-SOE samples. SOEs are much 
larger, with total assets over USD 6.4 billion, compared to USD 1.9 billion for non-SOEs. Further, 
SOEs are more profitable, with higher ROA, have higher leverage and a higher proportion of 
tangible assets (PPE) as a proportion of total assets. SOEs and non-SOEs do not differ significantly 
in capital expenditures. SOEs are slightly less capital constrained, as measured by the HP index.  
SOEs invest more in R&D than non-SOE, both in absolute terms (SOEs invest on average 
$13.6m in R&D, non-SOEs $5.2m) and as a proportion of total assets (2.2% for SOEs vs. 1.8% for 
non-SOEs). SOEs produce, on an average, 9.25 patents in each year, versus 5.02 patents for non-
SOEs, but fewer patents “for each dollar invested”: SOEs produce 0.17 patents for each $1million 
invested in R&D, while non-SOEs produce 0.19. SOEs and non-SOEs do not differ significantly 
in the average number of cites per patent (0.060 for SOEs and 0.068 for non-SOEs), but do differ 
substantially in terms of the average number of cites per patent scaled by R&D investment: SOEs 
generate 6.35 cites per patent for each $1billion invested in R&D, while non-SOEs generate over 
ten times as many, at 66 cites per patent per $1billion in R&D.  
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
The first step in our analysis is to estimate the impact of government ownership and control 
on the investment in R&D at the firm-year level. There are various ways in which government 
ownership could affect the investment in innovation by SOEs. First, SOE managers might face 
weaker incentives. SOE compensation tends to be less responsive to performance, because 
government ownership tends to isolate firms from the threat of a takeover (in turn increasing 
managerial job security). Also, managers may be less incentivized because sovereign owners are 
weaker monitors than other institutional blockholders. These weaker incentives could lead to under-
exertion of effort and excessive risk-aversion, implying a lower level of effort in general, and lower 
levels of investment in risky activities such as R&D. In addition, government ownership could 
impose short-term social and political goals (Shleifer, 1998; Kahan and Rock, 2010) that divert 
firm resources away from investments with a long-term payoff such as R&D. On the other hand, 
government ownership could help by relaxing constraints on investment in R&D. This could be 
driven by multiple things. First, the long investment horizons of governments and the stable 
availability of financing provided by state-owned banks allow SOEs to focus on long-term projects, 
including R&D. Second, the high opacity and long-horizon of R&D investment lead to 
underfunding. Government ownership, by providing implicit debt guarantees and access to state 
owned banks, could relax financial constraints and allow for larger investment in R&D (O’Hara 
and Wayne, 1990; Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006; Borisova and Megginson, 2011; 
Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi, 2013; Acharya, Anginer, and Warburton, 2014). Yet, while relaxing 
constraints on debt financing, government ownership could also increase financial constraints of 
firms by preventing access to equity markets (Ben-Nasr, Boubakri, and Cosset, 2012; Chen, Wang, 
Li, Sun, Tong, 2015; D’Souza and Nash, 2017). Finally, Arrow (1951) and Debreu (1959) find that 
private agents underinvest in goods that produce high levels of social-benefit spillover and have 
low commercial value, as they are unable to fully internalize the benefits of such investments. 
Accordingly, privately held firms underinvest in technology (Arrow, 1962; Lerner and Hall, 2010). 
Yet, governments and affiliated SOEs share some of those social goals and are thus better posed to 
internalize the benefits produced by innovation. This would imply higher levels of investment in 
R&D. 
These conflicting predictions point to the need to formally investigate the impact of 
government ownership on investment in R&D. We do so by means of regression analysis in the 
following sections. 
 
3.1 Government ownership and R&D investment, base regressions 
As a starting point of our analysis, we model R&D investment, scaled by total assets, in a 
regression framework. As explanatory variables, we include observable characteristics that can 
influence research and development investment such as firm size (total assets), profitability (return 
on assets), leverage (debt-to-assets), capital expenditures (scaled by total assets), and property-plant 
and equipment (scaled by total assets). All metrics are as of December 31 of the previous year, to 
avoid issues related to simultaneity. We also include the previous-year expenditure in R&D, 
similarly scaled by total assets, as R&D can be a relatively persistent process. R&D investment can 
also vary widely by industry type with newer industries like healthcare and telecommunications 
demanding higher levels of R&D to remain competitive. To control for such industry specific trends 
we include industry-year fixed effects. There may also be unobservable differences in the tax 
treatment of R&D investment at the country level that would encourage firms to systematically 
report R&D differently by country. We include a full set of country-year fixed affects to address 
concerns with such omitted variables.  
Our sample consists of firm-year observations from 1999 to 2015. Because the global 
environment at that time included multiple macro-financial crisis periods that may influence firm 
level investment, we include a financial crisis indicator representing the country-years identified as 
experiencing a financial crisis, as in Laeven and Valencia (2013).  All firm level variables are 
expressed in USD, where relevant and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, to mitigate the 
impact of outliers or bad data points. The main variable of interest in our base model is the binary 
variable identifying the presence of a government shareholder, SOE. Using the specification below 
we test to see if R&D investment is associated with the presence of a sovereign owner:
 
𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝛽 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ?⃗?𝛾 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹����������⃗ 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 + 𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 ∗
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (2). 
 
Results for this base model are presented in the first column of Table 3. The coefficient 
estimate associated with the main variable of interest, SOE, is positive and statistically significant 
at the 10% level, and equal to 0.001. Accordingly, our estimates indicate that the presence of a 
government shareholder is associated with an increase in R&D expenditure equal to 0.1% of total 
assets. Given that the average R&D expenditure in our sample is about 1.8% of total assets, this 
represents a 5.5% percent increase in R&D investment. While, for brevity, we refrain from 
discussing coefficient estimates associated with the other control variables in detail, we note that 
they are roughly consistent with expectations based on prior literature. For example, results indicate 
that capital constrained firms invest less in R&D.  
Yet, a simple toehold might not reveal the full impact of government ownership. The 
imposition of social or political goals might be instead associated with larger stakes, allowing 
politicians to exercise a greater degree of influence and control over the firm. Accordingly, in a 
second model, we add a variable measuring the size of the government stake in the firm, Gov Stake. 
Coefficient estimates from this second model, presented in Column 2 of Table 3, indicate that, 
while the presence of a government shareholder is associated with an increase in R&D spending, 
larger stakes are associated with a decline in R&D. We confirm this finding with estimates from a 
third model, presented in Column 3, in which we replace the continuous variable Gov Stake with a 
binary variable, Gov Control, set equal to one when the size of the government stake exceeds 50%, 
and zero otherwise. In both cases, the coefficient estimate associated with SOE is positive and 
significant at the 5% level, while coefficients of Gov Stake and Gov Control are negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. These findings suggest that, while 
a minority government stake increases R&D investment, presumably by relaxing financial 
constraints that are associated with underinvestment in innovation, a large or controlling stake 
decreases it, by imposing social and political priorities of a short term-nature, consistent with the 
“myopic government” hypothesis. This is consistent with the findings of D’Souza and Nash (2017), 
as they document potential agency conflicts between the state and minority shareholders when the 
state holds a majority stake in a listed firm.  
We note that, if the presence of a government shareholder acts by relaxing financial 
constraints, the impact should be stronger on firms that are facing high financial constraints a priori. 
We accordingly identify financially constrained firms by computing the HP index, as discussed in 
Section 2.3. Each year, we label firms with an HP index above the median as financially constrained 
and construct a binary variable, Constrained, set equal to one for financially constrained firms and 
zero otherwise. We further interact this variable with SOE and Gov Stake. If the presence of a 
government shareholder reacts mainly via the relaxation of financial constraints, we expect the 
coefficient estimate associated with the SOE × Constrained interaction to be positive. We similarly 
interact SOE and Gov Stake with the binary variable identifying a financial crisis, Fin Crisis. As 
governments remove financial constraints via access to state-owned banks, we expect such impact 
to be weaker during a financial crisis, when bank capital is scarce and possibly directed to more 
short-term priorities. The results, presented in Column 4 of Table 3, are consistent with our 
expectations. The coefficient associated with the SOE × Constrained interaction is positive and 
significant at the 10% level, indicating that a government minority stake increases R&D investment 
by a larger amount in financially constrained firms. On the other side, the coefficient on the SOE × 
Fin Crisis variable is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. Its magnitude is equal 
to the coefficient associated with SOE, but of opposite sign, suggesting that government minority 
stakes relax financial constraints by increasing R&D expenditures by about 10% during non-crises, 
but have no impact during financial crises. The increase for capital constrained firms, during non-
crises, is even more dramatic, at about 20%. As before, a larger government stake is associated 
with a decline in R&D expenditures, with the effect being particularly strong for capital constrained 
firms. This suggest that, while minority government ownership relaxes financial constraints by 
providing access to state-owned banks and cheaper debt due to implicit debt guarantees (Borisova 
et al,. 2015), a controlling stake could hinder access to private equity markets due to the threat of 
conflict between the government and minority shareholders (D’Souza and Nash, 2017, find that 
firms with majority government ownership are less likely to raise capital abroad, via cross-listings).  
To add insight into the impact of a large government stake, we estimate a last model, 
replacing Gov Stake and its interactions with Gov Control. We find largely consistent results. 
Minority government stakes are associated with larger R&D investments, particularly for capital 
constrained firms, but not during financial crises. Controlling government stakes are associated 
with a decline in R&D investment, supporting the myopic government hypotheses. Even more, the 
significant interaction between Gov Control and Constrained suggests that a controlling stake does 
not simply impose short-term priorities, but increases financial constraints as well. This is 
consistent with government-controlled firms having more difficulty accessing financial markets, 
particularly equity markets (Ben-Nasr et al., 2012; Stulz, 2005). Stulz (2005). Finally, the 
coefficient estimate associated with the interaction between Gov Control and Fin Crisis is negative 
and statistically significant, indicating that government controlled firms cut R&D investment 
during financial crises, which is again consistent with the myopic government hypotheses.  
3.1.1 Government ownership and R&D investment, firm fixed effects 
It is likely that government ownership is non-random—the descriptive statistics of our 
sample indicate that SOEs tend to be larger, more profitable, and more highly levered than private-
sector firms. As a consequence, the relation between government ownership and firm’s investment 
in R&D could be confounded by an omitted-variable bias induced by unobserved firm 
characteristics. As a first attempt at mitigating such problem, we substitute industry-year and 
country-year fixed effects for year and firm fixed effects. This allows us to control for time-
invariant unobserved firm-characteristics and thus mitigate the potential biases driven by fixed firm 
characteristics.  
We estimate the same models discussed in the previous section, now with firm and year 
fixed effects (but without the industry-level fixed effects, which are redundant in this context). 
Coefficient estimates and related test-statistics are presented in Table 4. Results are somewhat 
weaker in this specification, reflecting the fact that we are only capturing the time-series variation 
in government ownership and ignoring the more significant cross-sectional differences. In the first 
three models, respectively with SOE, SOE and Gov Stake, and SOE and Gov Control, none of the 
estimated coefficients is statistically significant. Yet, when we add the relevant interactions with 
Constrained and Fin Crisis, the coefficient on SOE is positive, statistically significant at 10%, and 
of the same magnitude as in the base model (without firm fixed effects). The coefficient on Control 
is negative and statistically significant at 10%, and the coefficient on the interaction SOE × Fin 
Crisis is negative and significant at 5%. Overall, these results are consistent with the findings 
without firm fixed effects, but statistical significance is weaker. The lower power of time-series 
tests, after absorbing firm fixed effects, is not surprising, given that government ownership varies 
more in the cross-section, than over time.  
This firm fixed effects approach mitigates selection issues related to government 
ownership, but does not fully solve them, as it cannot account for time-variant firm characteristics. 
Accordingly, we present further robustness tests in the following section by implementing an 
instrumental variable approach. 
3.1.2 Government ownership and R&D expenditures, instrumental variable approach 
We use two-stages least square instrumental variable models, mirroring the approach in 
Borisova et al. (2015). The initial selection equation is fit using models describing the 
characteristics associated with the presence of government owners. The first-stage equations 
include firm-specific variables present in the second-stage outcome equation and industry-year 
fixed effects as well as variables that predict the presence of government ownership and are 
exogenous to the R&D outcome we intend to model in the second stage. Specifically, we employ 
two binary variables, also at the country level: Civil law (from Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and 
Shleifer, (2008)) and Left-wing (from Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh, (2001)), which 
describe the legal system origin and the political party of the nation’s chief executive in a given 
year, respectively. We anticipate a positive relation between government ownership and Civil law, 
as state owners could more easily divert resources towards social and political goals in a legal 
environment providing less protection to minority shareholders. Bortolotti and Faccio (2009) find 
higher government control in nations governed by left-wing political parties, who are more likely 
to pursue social goals via economic intervention, and a positive relation is predicted between Left-
wing and state presence. We also use the annual country-level measures Total investment and 
Unemployment rate from the firm’s home nation. These values are collected from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). A larger Unemployment rate suggests a higher likelihood of government 
investment with a goal of job preservation. Higher national values of Total investment indicate 
higher availability of funding to the government for investment purposes, and greater state holdings 
are possible in these cases. Yet, when total investment declines, as during macroeconomic crises, 
governments tend to step-in and bail struggling firms, possibly leading to an increase in government 
ownership. Accordingly, the relation between total investment and government ownership is a 
matter for empirical investigation. While we expect these country-level factors to predict 
government ownership, they are not likely to directly influence a firm’s level of investment in 
R&D. For a further discussion of the relevance and exclusion criteria related to those instruments, 
and related test statistics, we refer interested readers to Borisova et al. (2015), noting that both their 
sample of interest and ours are comprised by European publicly traded firms with minority or 
majority government ownership stakes.  
In the first model, we only include the instrumented binary variable identifying the 
presence of a government shareholder (and the usual set of controls) in the second stage. The first-
stage coefficient estimates indicate that government shareholding is more likely in civil law 
countries and in environments with high levels of unemployment, consistent with our priors. The 
level of investment, scaled by GDP, is negatively related with government shareholding, suggesting 
that, when private-sector investment is lagging, the government might increase ownership, perhaps 
via bailouts. The surprising result is the coefficient estimate associated with the left-wing dummy 
variable, indicating that government ownership is less likely in left-wing countries. This result is 
puzzling and contrary to our priors. It could be an economic artifact, as we note a high level of 
correlation between the civil-law binary variable and the left-wing dummy. Or it could be an 
historical accident: during the timeframe we investigate in our sample, multiple European nations 
that have had a long left-wing tradition and substantial government-owned sectors have seen 
centrist parties come to power. 
In the second stage, while the coefficient estimate associated with the instrumented variable 
SOE is positive and of approximately the same magnitude as in the previous-discussed estimates, 
it is not statistically significant. Yet, we obtain statistically significant results in the second two-
stage model we estimate, including instrumented variables identifying both the presence of a 
government shareholder and the size of the stake owned. In this model, we confirm our previous 
findings—the presence of a government shareholder increases investment in R&D, while 
government control has the opposite effect.  
We further attempt two-stage models including interactions between government presence 
and control and metrics of firm-level financial constraints and financial crises. Following 
Wooldridge (2010), we include interactions of the same exogenous variables with the financial 
crisis and with the binary variable identifying financially constrained firms to instrument our 
interaction term of interest. Second stage results indicate that minority government stakes are 
associated with greater investment in R&D, while controlling stakes are associated with a decline 
in R&D investment. We find no robust results on the interactions.  
 
3.2 Government ownership and the number of patents 
The previous analysis focuses on the inputs of the innovation process, that is, expenditure 
on R&D. Yet, we have reason to suspect that government ownership and control affect the 
efficiency of the process as well, as a vast literature finds that government ownership is generally 
associated with less efficient firm, due to a lack of monitoring by the government owners, and 
weaker incentives for managers. As a metric for how efficient the firm is in producing innovation, 
we compute the ratio of the number of patents produced scaled by R&D expenditure—effectively, 
a metric for the number of patents per dollar invested in R&D.  
In a multivariate setting, we analyze the impact of government ownership and control over 
this efficiency metric. While we focus on the patent efficiency two years following the patent 
application date, we look at the impact over the next one, two, and three years, finding largely 
consistent results. The set of explanatory variables we employ in various models is the same as in 
the regression models estimates presented in Table 3, including country-year and industry-year 
fixed effects, but also for time-variant firm characteristics, and identifiers for financially 
constrained firms and for financial crises. As before, the variables of interests are SOE, Gov Stake, 
Gov Control, and their interactions with Constrained and Fin Crisis. The results presented in Table 
6 refer to the two-year impact: so the response variable Pat Count over R&D is the patent count as 
of December 31 of year t divided by the R&D expenditure of year t-2, while all explanatory 
variables are as of December 31 of year t-2.  
In all models, the presence of a minority government stake is associated with a decrease in 
the number of patents scaled by R&D investment. The coefficient estimates are statistically 
significant in models 1, 2, and 3, at the 5% level, but not in models 4, and 5.  
Consistent with our univariate analysis, we find that the presence of a government 
shareholder is negatively related to the number of patents produced by SOEs over the following 
years, with results significant over all time horizons. The coefficients on Gov Stake, Gov Control, 
and all interactions are not statistically significant, indicating that the inefficiencies associated with 
government ownership are unaffected by the size of the stake, by capital constraints, or by financial 
crises. 
3.2.1 Government ownership and the number of patents, firm fixed effects 
 As before, we are concerned about the non-random nature of government ownership. As a 
first attempt to mitigate the related potential biases, we re-estimate the same models with the 
inclusion of firm fixed effects, mirroring the approach employed when investigating the impact of 
government ownership on R&D expenditure. Our results, presented in Table 7, are largely 
consistent, indicating that the presence of a government shareholder is associated with a less 
efficient process, as measured by a decline in the number of patents scaled by R&D investment. 
Yet, in this set of results, we find that the effect is weaker for government-controlled firms and for 
financially constrained firms. 
3.2.2 The overall impact of government ownership on patent counts 
 Our findings so far indicate that government ownership is associated with an increase in 
R&D spending, at least for minority government-owned firms during non-crises periods, and 
especially for financially constrained firms. Yet, we have evidence of lower efficiency in the 
process, with the number of patents per dollar invested in R&D subsequently declining, at least 
over one, two, and three year horizon windows. Which leaves open the question—how does 
government ownership affect the quantity of innovation ultimately produced by the firm, as proxied 
by the number of patents?  
 To answer this question, we estimate a new series of models, mirroring the same sets of 
explanatory variables, with the log of the number of patents as the response variable. As before, we 
estimate models over a one, two, and three year window, but, for brevity, present results related to 
the two-year event window only, in the more stringent model with firm fixed effects, in Table 8. 
The main finding is that the presence of a government shareholder decreases the count of patents 
by approximately 10%. Interestingly, the decline is of a smaller magnitude (only about 3%) in 
capital constrained firms, as the inefficiencies associated with government ownership are partially 
counterbalanced by a relaxation of financial constraints. 
 
3.3 Government ownership and patent quality 
The findings so far relate to the quantity of innovation (as proxied by the number of patents) 
that the firm produces. Yet, government ownership might affect not just the quantity of innovation, 
but also its quality. Inefficiencies could translate into not only fewer patents, but patents of lower 
overall quality. In addition, a greater orientation towards innovation with social and political 
spillover could lead to patents with lower commercial value. We investigate both issues in the 
following sections.  
3.3.1 Government ownership and patent citations 
To investigate the impact of government ownership on patent quality, we first focus on 
the number of cites per patent, which has often been employed as a standard metric of patent 
quality in the extant literature. We conduct empirical analysis via regressions. Our setup and list 
of control variables mirrors what we have first employed in Table 3 and, with the addition of firm 
fixed effects, in Table 4.  
For brevity, we refrain from discussing individual model estimates. The overall picture 
paints a consistent set of results, as, in all cases, we fail to detect any impact of government 
ownership, either through minority or majority stakes, or with interactions with metrics of capital 
constraints or financial crises, on the average number of cites per patent. Our results strongly 
suggest that government ownership does not impact the average patent quality, at least as 
measured by the average number of cites per patent.  
3.3.2 The commercial value of patents—event studies 
Extant literature finds that the announcement of new patents leads, on average, to a positive 
market reaction, in the form of abnormal short-term returns on the stock prices of publicly traded 
firms (Kogan et al., 2017). This market reaction is a measure of increased firm value. Extant studies 
attribute this increase to the commercial value of the innovation being patented and, accordingly, 
interpret the abnormal market reaction as a measure of the commercial value of the invention. If 
SOEs produce patents with lower commercial value (and potentially higher social spillover or 
political benefits), we should observe a weaker market reaction at announcement.  
To investigate the market reaction at loan initiation, we rely on event-study methodology. 
The main proxy for the impact of a new patent on firm value is the abnormal return at the time of 
the announcement of the patent approval. To estimate the abnormal market reaction at 
announcement, we obtain daily total return indices, adjusted for dividends and splits, in USD, for 
the primary common equity issue for each firm in our sample. We also obtain local market indices, 
similarly adjusted for dividends and splits and denominated in USD. All data is from Thomson 
Reuter’s Datastream database. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are computed by subtracting 
the total market return from the patenting firm’s stock total return over various intervals on and 
around the day on which the loan is initiated (day 0). We present results for various short-term 
window spanning from one-day (day 0) to twenty-one days (-10,+10), to capture the effect of 
possible leakage of information or delayed disclosure. Results for SOEs are presented in Table X, 
Panel A, while results for private-sector firms are presented in panel B. We are able to compute 
ten-day (twenty-one-day) abnormal returns for 21,162 (63,179) patent announcements by SOEs 
(private-sector firms).  Observations are excluded from the analysis if return data is missing during 
the event window. We find a mean abnormal return of 0.67% over the twenty-one day event 
window, and a median abnormal return of 0.63%. We test the statistical significance of mean 
abnormal returns using the standard Patell’s z (Patell, 1976) test and the skewness-adjusted t-test 
described by Hall (1992) to correct for the skewness of abnormal returns, and employ a generalized 
sign test for medians. All tests are highly statistically significant, well below the 1% level. Over 
shorter event windows, the magnitude of the estimated effect declines, but the statistical 
significance of the estimate results remains robust.  
When applying the same methodology to the sample of private-sector patent 
announcements, we find very similar results. The magnitude of the estimated impact is slightly 
smaller, with a mean (median) abnormal return of 0.64% (0.60%) over the twenty-one day event 
window, but the difference in means (medians) is economically negligible. We estimate and report 
two-sample t-test statistics for the significance of the difference in abnormal returns between the 
SOE and private-sector samples, but, for all event window, fail to reject the null hypotheses (that 
the difference is zero) at any conventional level of significance.  
Overall, our results indicate that patents produced by SOEs have substantial commercial 
value. The abnormal market reaction estimate indicates an increase in firm value of approximately 
0.67% at patent announcement. In unreported robustness tests, we find even stronger estimates for 
sub-samples of high-quality patents: patents in the upper decile of citation count—an ex-post 
measure of patent quality—lead to an abnormal market reaction of approximately 4%. Yet, we find 
very similar results for private-sector patents, suggesting that SOEs pursue innovation with the 
same level of commercial value as their private-sector counterparties.  
 
3.3.3 Sustainable innovation 
Given that governments have different goals than private-sector shareholders, we 
hypothesize that government ownership could affect not only R&D investment and the quantity 
and quality of innovation, but also the type of innovation produced by the firm. In particular, new 
technologies can provide benefits to society at a large, which cannot be fully captured by the 
commercial value of the patent. Such innovation is likely to be underfunded by the private sector. 
Governments, on the other side, are in a position to prioritize patents with such high social value. 
In line with extant literature, we identify a set of “sustainable patents,” using the Cooperative Patent 
Classification sub-groups by the European Patent Office. These are patents related to technologies 
aimed at climate change mitigation and, in broader terms, related to clean energy sources.10 Our 
prior is that SOEs, given their greater concern for patents with social value, are more likely to 
pursue innovation aimed at such sustainable patents.  
To test our hypothesis, we re-estimate the models in Table 9, but with a different response 
variable: we replace the total number of patents with a subset, the number of sustainable patents, at 
the firm-year level. In the various models, we identify government ownership with either SOE, Gov 
Stake, Gov Control, and we add their interactions with Constrained and Fin Crisis. Models are 
estimated with firm and year fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the firm level. In all 
cases, we find no significant relation between government ownership, government stake, nor 
government control (nor any of their interactions) and the number of sustainable patents produced 
by the firm. This is contrary to our priors and indicates, consistent with the event study and patent 
citation number analysis, that government ownership does not affect the quality or type of 
innovation pursued by the firm.  
 
 
4. Conclusions 
We study the impact of government minority and majority ownership on the innovativeness 
of publicly traded European firms. The analysis of investment in research and development reveals 
                                                          
10 Each sub-group was devised in coordination with field experts using the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. For more information, 
please refer to Table 4 in the Appendix. The sub-group classification by the EPO is available at: 
https://www.epo.org/news-issues/issues/classification/classification.html 
important insights into the impact of government ownership on inputs in the innovation process 
and points to a nuanced picture. A minority government stake increases R&D expenditures. These 
results are particularly strong for financially constrained firm, but weaken during financial crises, 
suggesting that the likely channel by which government ownership impacts investment in R&D is 
via a relaxation of financial constraints by providing privileged access to state-owned banks. Yet, 
government control leads to the opposite effect, both by imposing myopic goals and complicating 
access to private equity markets. Our results are robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects and to 
the implementation of a two-stage instrumental variable estimation process.  
In terms of outputs, we find that government ownership decreases the efficiency of the 
innovation process, by leading to fewer patents “per dollar of R&D” and, overall, a decline in the 
number of patents of about 10% for the average firm, and of about 3% for previously financially 
constrained enterprises. Finally, we find that the patents produced by SOEs do not differ 
significantly from private-sector patents, neither in terms of average number of cites, nor in terms 
of commercial value, as proxied by the market reaction at the announcement of a patent’s 
application. On an average, announcement of a patent filing leads to an increase in firm value by 
about 0.6%, which is consistent for both SOEs and private-sector enterprises. 
Some unexplored related questions point to possible extensions. We have not formally 
investigated whether SOE patents are more likely to focus on “socially beneficial” innovation—for 
example, are SOEs more likely to develop technologies in specific sectors, such as medicine or 
defense? We have looked at climate-related innovation, but that is a small subset of technologies 
with high public value. Related, we have not investigated possible spillover and the generation of 
derived innovation—if SOEs focus more on early-stage innovation, we could see more derived 
patents following SOE patents, in contrast to private-sector patents.   
Our data covers publicly traded firms in European countries. Accordingly, one limitation 
lies in the exclusion of non-listed firms with partial government ownership and of firms that are 
fully government owned. While it is possible that the impact of full government ownership differs, 
qualitative and quantitatively, from that of partial ownership, data limitations do not allow us to 
test such effects directly. And, of course, our dataset is limited to European firms, thus leaving open 
the question whether the results would extend to regimes with substantially different financial 
systems, legal institutions, and cultural norms.  
We should also note that our manuscript identifies only one channel by which governments 
can impact innovation—direct ownership of firms. Yet, governments can promote innovativeness 
via subsidized lending, via grants, by financing research via educational institutions or think thanks, 
and by enhancing the protection or intellectual property rights, amongst other channels.  
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
This table provides definitions and data sources for the main variables of interest in our dataset. 
Variable Name Definition Source 
R&D i,t Investment in research and development scaled 
by total assets of firm i in year t.   
TR Worldscope 
Count i,t+n The number of (eventually) granted patents 
applied for by firm i in year t+n,  We include 
patents across all patent offices in the sample. 
BvD Orbis  
 
SusCount i,t+n The number of (eventually) granted patents 
applied for by firm i in year t+n that fall within 
a Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC) sub-
groups tagged as sustainable technologies.  See 
Appendix Table 4 for list of CPC sub-groups. 
EPO 
Countt+n/R&D i,t The number of (eventually) granted patents 
applied for by firm i in year t+n scaled by 
R&D ($ millions CPI adjusted with a base year 
of 2004) expenditures in year t.  We include 
patents across all patent offices in the sample. 
BvD Orbis  
 
CpCt+n/R&D i,t The average number of citations received by 
granted patents applied for in year t+n for firm 
i scaled by R&D ($ billions CPI adjusted with 
a base year of 2004) expenditures in year t.  
Citation numbers are adjusted for truncation 
bias based on the patent office of filing. 
BvD Orbis (citation 
count, patent count) 
EPO PATSTAT 
(truncation adjustment) 
SOE i,t Indicator that firm i has a domestic sovereign 
owner in year t. 
BvD Orbis  
GovStake i,t Percent of ownership in firm i belonging to a 
domestic sovereign owner in year t. 
BvD Orbis  
GovControl i,t Indicator that firm i has a domestic sovereign 
owner in year t with a percent of ownership 
greater than 50%. 
BvD Orbis 
ROA i,t Return on assets (%) of firm i in year t. TR Worldscope 
PPE i,t Book value of plants, property, and equipment 
scaled by total assets of firm i in year t. 
TR Worldscope 
Debt i,t Outstanding debt scaled by total assets of firm i 
in year t. 
TR Worldscope 
CAPEX i,t Investment in capital expenditures scaled by 
total assets of firm i in year t. 
TR Worldscope 
Assets i,t Total assets of firm i in year t scaled by the 
consumer pricing index with a base year of 
2004. 
TR Worldscope 
Constrained i,t Indicator that firm i has an HP-index above the 
median HP-index in year t.  HP-index is 
calculated from Hadlock and Pierce (2010) 
using the firm’s size and age.  We use the 
firm’s total assets for size and the number of 
years a firm is present in TR Worldscope as the 
firm age.   
 
LeftWing j,t Indicator if country j’s chief executive belongs 
to a left-wing political party in year t. 
Beck, Clarke, Groff, 
Keefer, and Walsh, 
2001 
CivilLaw j,t Legal system of origin of country j in year t Djankov, Hart, 
McLiesh, and Shleifer, 
2008 
Investment  IMF 
Unemployment j,t Unemployment rate in country j in year t IMF 
FinCrisis i,t Indicator denoting firm i is headquartered in a 
country experiencing a financial crisis in year t  
Laeven and Valencia 
(2013) 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
This table provides summary statistics for firms within our sample. Panel A tabulates the 
distributions of firms (SOEs and non-SOEs) by industry. Panel B provides summary statistics for 
the dispersion of countries represented in the sample. Panel C provides summary statistics for the 
firm-year characteristics while Panels D provides a comparison of means for the subsample of 
firms that are non-sovereign owned and sovereign owned enterprises.  
 
Panel A: Firms by Industry 
  Non-SOE   SOE 
  N  %   N % 
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 61 1.60%   11 0.81% 
Mining and Construction 365 9.59%   128 9.39% 
Manufacturing 1477 38.79%   624 45.78% 
Transportation & Public Utilities 363 9.53%   184 13.50% 
Retail Trade 402 10.56%   129 9.46% 
Services 1127 29.60%   282 20.69% 
Public Administration and Non-Classified 13 0.34%   5 0.37% 
  3808 100.00%   1363 100.00% 
 
Panel B: Country Composition of Firm-Year observations 
  Frequency       Frequency 
AT - Austria 556 1.63%  HU - Hungry 216 0.63% 
BE – Belgium 847 2.48%  IE – Ireland 543 1.59% 
BG – Bulgaria 466 1.36%  LT – Lithuania 87 0.25% 
CY – Cyprus 308 0.90%  LU – Luxemburg 234 0.68% 
CZ – Czech Republic 143 0.42%  LV – Latvia 112 0.33% 
DE – Germany 5,503 16.09%  MT – Malta 50 0.15% 
DK – Denmark 953 2.79%  NL – Netherlands 1,051 3.07% 
EE – Estonia 66 0.19%  PL – Poland 1,708 5.00% 
ES – Spain 948 2.77%  PT = Portugal 449 1.31% 
FI – Finland 1,132 3.31%  RO - Romania 407 1.19% 
FR – France 4,819 14.09%  SE – Sweden 2,214 6.48% 
GB – United Kingdom 9,972 29.16%  SI – Slovenia 142 0.42% 
GR - Greece 1,212 3.54%   SK - Slovakia 54 0.16% 
 
 
  
Panel C: Full Sample 
Variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 
R&D/TA i,t  34,192 0.019 0.054 0 0 0.003 
R&D ($k) 34,192 6,079 17,868 0 0 445 
Count i,t 34,192 5.43 61.5 0 0 0 
Countt /R&Dt ($m) 32,783 0.192 3.31 0 0 0 
CitePerCount i,t 34,192 0.067 0.734 0 0 0 
CitePerCountt/R&Dt I ($b) 33,815 60.1 6770 0 0 0 
SOE i,t 34,192 0.098 0.298 0 0 0 
GovStake i,t 34,192 0.671 5.095 0 0 0 
GovControl i,t 34,192 0.004 0.062 0 0 0 
FinCrisis i,t 34,192 0.220 0.413 0 0 0 
ROA i,t (%) 34,192 0.337 19.9 -0.26 4.48 8.65 
PPE/TA i,t 34,192 0.268 0.236 0.067 0.206 0.410 
Debt/TA i,t 34,192 0.207 0.192 0.035 0.172 0.324 
CAPEX/TA i,t 34,192 0.055 0.062 0.015 0.035 0.070 
Assets i,t ($m) 34,192 2,308 10,790 28 108 557 
HP index 34,192 -2.14 0.679 -2.61 -2.29 -1.82 
Constrained i,t 34,192 0.493 0.500 0 0 1 
 
Panel D: Non-Sovereign Owned Enterprises and SOE differences 
 Non-SOE SOE   
Variable N Mean N Mean Difference t 
R&D/TA i,t  30,834 0.018 3,358 0.0229 -0.00456*** -28.88 
R&D ($k) 30,834 5260 3,358 13600 -8320*** -27.88 
Count i,t 30,834 5.02 3,358 9.25 -4.24*** -26.88 
Countt /R&Dt ($m) 29,545 0.194 3,238 0.169 0.0257 -25.88 
CitePerCount i,t 30,834 0.068 3,358 0.060 0.00783 -24.88 
CitePerCountt/R&Dt I 
($b) 30,473 66.0 
3,342 
6.35 59.6 -23.88 
GovStake i,t 30,834 0 3,358 6.83 -6.83*** -21.88 
GovControl i,t 30,834 0 3,358 0.040 -0.0399*** -20.88 
FinCrisis i,t 30,834 0.190 3,358 0.484 -0.294*** -19.88 
ROA i,t (%) 30,834 -0.008 3,358 3.51 -3.51*** -18.88 
PPE/TA i,t 30,834 0.266 3,358 0.286 -0.0192*** -17.88 
Debt/TA i,t 30,834 0.206 3,358 0.212 -0.00588* -16.88 
CAPEX/TA i,t 30,834 0.055 3,358 0.054 0.000882 -15.88 
Assets i,t ($m) 30,834 1,860 3,358 6,440 -0.00458*** -14.88 
HP index 30,834 -2.11 3,358 -2.40 0.288*** -13.88 
Constrained i,t 30,834 0.516 3,358 0.279 0.237*** -12.88 
 
Table 3: R&D expenditures and Sovereign Ownership 
This table presents the OLS regression results from Equation (2) where scaled R&D expenditures 
in year t+1 are regressed on contemporaneous government ownership, time varying firm level 
characteristics, country-year fixed effects, and industry-year fixed effects.  SOE is an indicator 
that firm i has a domestic sovereign owner in year t while GovStake is a continuous variable 
denoting the percent ownership of the domestic sovereign.  GovControl is an indicator that firm i 
has a domestic sovereign owner with at least a 50% ownership stake.  Definitions for the firm 
characteristics can be found in the Variable Appendix.  Firm level characteristics are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99%.  Standard errors are clustered by firm.  The numbers in parenthesis are t-
statistics.  ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables R&D/TA i,t+1 R&D/TA i,t+1 R&D/TA i,t+1 R&D/TA i,t+1 R&D/TA i,t+1 
            
SOE i,t 0.001* 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.001** 
 (-1.90) (-2.12) (-1.99) (-2.28) (-2.10) 
GovStake i,t  -0.000**  -0.000**    (-2.36)  (-2.48)  
GovControl i,t   -0.002**  -0.002** 
   (-2.36)  (-2.49) 
SOE i,t x Constrained i,t    0.002* 0.002 
    (-1.68) (-1.58) 
GovStake i,t x Constrained i,t    -0.000**      (-2.12)  
GovControl i,t x Constrained i,t     -0.008*** 
     (-3.29) 
SOE i,t x FinCrisis i,t    -0.002* -0.002* 
    (-1.86) (-1.70) 
GovStake i,t x FinCrisis i,t    0.00      (-0.88)  
GovControl i,t x FinCrisis i,t     0.002** 
     (-2.02) 
Constrained i,t -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** 
 (-1.88) (-1.87) (-1.87) (-2.14) (-2.16) 
FinCrisis i,t -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 
 (-0.77) (-0.75) (-0.76) (-0.72) (-0.73) 
ROA i,t -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-3.29) (-3.30) (-3.30) (-3.30) (-3.30) 
PPE/TA i,t -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-7.93) (-7.84) (-7.87) (-7.93) (-7.96) 
Debt/TA i,t -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (-6.49) (-6.50) (-6.50) (-6.47) (-6.46) 
CAPEX/TA i,t -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** 
 (-2.18) (-2.20) (-2.19) (-2.16) (-2.15) 
Assets i,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.39) (-0.24) (-0.32) (-0.07) (-0.13) 
R&D/TA I,t 0.858*** 0.858*** 0.858*** 0.858*** 0.858*** 
 (-96.41) (-96.38) (-96.4) (-96.2) (-96.22) 
Constant 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (-1.57) (-1.56) (-1.56) (-1.59) (-1.60) 
      
Observations 34,192 34,192 34,192 34,192 34,192 
SE Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
clusters 5,153 5,153 5,153 5,153 5,153 
Country x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.760 0.760 0.760 0.760 0.760 
  
Table 4: R&D expenditures and Sovereign Ownership (Firm FE) 
This table presents the OLS regression results from Equation (2) where scaled R&D expenditures 
in year t+1 are regressed on contemporaneous government ownership, time varying firm level 
characteristics, year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects.  SOE is an indicator that firm i has a 
domestic sovereign owner in year t while GovStake is a continuous variable denoting the percent 
ownership of the domestic sovereign.  GovControl is an indicator that firm i has a domestic 
sovereign owner with at least a 50% ownership stake.  Definitions for the firm characteristics can 
be found in the Variable Appendix.  Firm level characteristics are winsorized at the 1% and 99%.  
Standard errors are clustered by firm.  The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics.  ***, **, and * 
represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables R&D/TA i,t+1 R&D/TA i,t+1 R&D/TA i,t+1 R&D/TA i,t+1 R&D/TA i,t+1 
            
SOE i,t 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.002* 0.001* 
 (0.06) (-0.10) (0.05) (1.84) (1.86) 
GovStake i,t  0.000  -0.000    (1.27)  (-1.45)  
GovControl i,t   0.000  -0.001* 
   (0.09)  (-1.68) 
SOE i,t x Constrained i,t    0.000 0.000 
    (0.06) (0.28) 
GovStake i,t x Constrained i,t    0.000      (1.36)  
GovControl i,t x Constrained i,t     -0.001 
     (-0.50) 
SOE i,t x FinCrisis i,t    -0.003** -0.003** 
    (-2.39) (-2.40) 
GovStake i,t x FinCrisis i,t    0.000      (1.32)  
GovControl i,t x FinCrisis i,t     0.002** 
     (2.26) 
Constrained i,t -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
 (-2.55) (-2.55) (-2.55) (-2.57) (-2.58) 
FinCrisis i,t -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.39) (-1.40) (-1.39) (-0.60) (-0.59) 
ROA i,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.86) (-0.86) (-0.86) (-0.86) (-0.86) 
PPE/TA i,t 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.47) (1.47) (1.47) (1.42) (1.41) 
Debt/TA i,t -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (-3.72) (-3.72) (-3.72) (-3.71) (-3.71) 
CAPEX/TA i,t -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* 
 (-1.71) (-1.71) (-1.71) (-1.69) (-1.68) 
Assets i,t -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (-2.21) (-2.22) (-2.21) (-2.18) (-2.17) 
R&D/TA I,t 0.412*** 0.412*** 0.412*** 0.412*** 0.412*** 
 (20.97) (20.97) (20.97) (20.96) (20.97) 
Constant 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (10.43) (10.43) (10.43) (10.54) (10.54) 
      
Observations 34,192 34,192 34,192 34,192 34,192 
SE Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
clusters 5,153 5,153 5,153 5,153 5,153 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.809 0.809 0.809 0.809 0.809 
Table 5: R&D expenditures and Sovereign Ownership (Instrument Variables) 
This table presents the two stage least squared (2SLS) regression results from Equation (2) where 
government ownership variables are instrumented by LeftWing, CivilLaw, Investment, and 
Unemployment in the first stage.  Columns (1)-(5) present the second stage results.  SOE is an 
indicator that firm i has a domestic sovereign owner in year t while GovStake is a continuous 
variable denoting the percent ownership of the domestic sovereign.  GovControl is an indicator 
that firm i has a domestic sovereign owner with at least a 50% ownership stake.  Definitions for 
the firm characteristics can be found in the Variable Appendix.  Firm level characteristics are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99%.  Standard errors are clustered by firm.  The numbers in 
parenthesis are t-statistics.  ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance 
levels respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables R&D/TA i,t+1 R&D/TA i,t+1 R&D/TA i,t+1 R&D/TA i,t+1 R&D/TA i,t+1 
            
SOE i,t 0.003 0.009*** 0.007* 0.018*** 0.010** 
 (1.18) (2.76) (1.84) (3.26) (2.21) 
GovStake i,t  -0.001**  -0.002***    (-2.06)  (-3.04)  
GovControl i,t   -0.239**  -0.120** 
   (-2.51)  (-2.06) 
SOE i,t x Constrained i,t    0.005 -0.001 
    (0.49) (-0.18) 
GovStake i,t x Constrained i,t    -0.003      (-1.31)  
GovControl i,t x Constrained i,t     -0.674 
     (-1.15) 
SOE i,t x FinCrisis i,t    -0.014** -0.004 
    (-2.29) (-0.64) 
GovStake i,t x FinCrisis i,t    0.002**      (2.38)  
GovControl i,t x FinCrisis i,t     0.186* 
     (1.69) 
Constrained i,t -0.000 -0.001 -0.001* -0.000 0.000 
 (-1.29) (-1.56) (-1.74) (-0.12) (0.08) 
FinCrisis i,t 0.001* 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (1.67) (0.48) (-0.47) (0.99) (0.60) 
ROA i,t -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-3.12) (-3.30) (-3.54) (-3.32) (-3.33) 
PPE/TA i,t -0.004*** -0.003** 0.000 -0.002** -0.004*** 
 (-9.69) (-2.56) (0.06) (-2.45) (-2.82) 
Debt/TA i,t -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (-6.75) (-6.85) (-6.25) (-7.11) (-6.60) 
CAPEX/TA i,t -0.005** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.004 0.001 
 (-2.43) (-2.89) (-2.88) (-1.15) (0.17) 
Assets i,t -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.04) (1.13) (1.59) (1.60) (0.54) 
R&D/TA i,t . 0.857*** 0.857*** 0.855*** 0.855*** 
 (102.39) (101.55) (100.55) (97.34) (93.62) 
Constant 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (6.53) (5.73) (4.21) (4.39) (4.63) 
      
Observations 33,726 33,726 33,726 33,726 33,726 
SE Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust 
Country x Year FE No No No No No 
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 6: Patent Efficiency and Sovereign Ownership  
This table presents the OLS regression results where future patent counts scaled by 
contemporaneous R&D are regressed on contemporaneous government ownership, time varying 
firm level characteristics, country-year fixed effects, and industry-year fixed effects.  SOE is an 
indicator that firm i has a domestic sovereign owner in year t while GovStake is a continuous 
variable denoting the percent ownership of the domestic sovereign.  GovControl is an indicator 
that firm I has a domestic sovereign owner with at least a 50% ownership stake.  Definitions for 
the firm characteristics can be found in the Variable Appendix.  Firm level characteristics are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99%.  Standard errors are clustered by firm.  The numbers in 
parenthesis are t-statistics.  ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance 
levels respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Countt+2/RDt  Countt+2/RDt  Countt+2/RDt  Countt+2/RDt  Countt+2/RDt  
            
SOE i,t -0.110** -0.102** -0.110** -0.083 -0.096 
 (-2.16) (-2.08) (-2.18) (-1.33) (-1.42) 
GovStake i,t  -0.001  -0.001    (-0.47)  (-0.43)  
GovControl i,t   -0.014  0.002 
   (-0.11)  (0.02) 
SOE i,t x Constrained i,t    0.080 0.078 
    (1.26) (1.20) 
GovStake i,t x Constrained i,t    -0.002      (-0.71)  
GovControl i,t x Constrained i,t     -0.249 
     (-1.34) 
SOE i,t x FinCrisis i,t    -0.108 -0.102 
    (-1.30) (-1.32) 
GovStake i,t x FinCrisis i,t    -0.001      (-0.24)  
GovControl i,t x FinCrisis i,t     -0.052 
     (-0.33) 
Constrained i,t -0.099* -0.099* -0.099* -0.103* -0.103* 
 (-1.87) (-1.87) (-1.87) (-1.86) (-1.86) 
FinCrisis i,t 0.216*** 0.218*** 0.215*** 0.258*** 0.251*** 
 (2.96) (2.98) (2.96) (3.13) (2.95) 
ROA i,t -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.00) (-1.00) (-1.00) (-0.98) (-0.98) 
PPE/TA i,t -0.161 -0.160 -0.161 -0.161 -0.162 
 (-1.49) (-1.47) (-1.48) (-1.48) (-1.50) 
Debt/TA i,t -0.382*** -0.383*** -0.382*** -0.381*** -0.380*** 
 (-3.45) (-3.45) (-3.45) (-3.45) (-3.44) 
CAPEX/TA i,t 0.588*** 0.586*** 0.587*** 0.589*** 0.591*** 
 (3.68) (3.68) (3.68) (3.69) (3.70) 
Assets i,t 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 (2.52) (2.51) (2.52) (2.51) (2.51) 
Constant -0.061 -0.061 -0.061 -0.058 -0.058 
 (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.37) (-0.37) 
      
Observations 27,855 27,855 27,855 27,855 27,855 
SE Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
clusters 4,778 4,778 4,778 4,778 4,778 
Country x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.00688 0.00685 0.00685 0.00672 0.00672 
Table 7: Patent Efficiency and Sovereign Ownership  
This table presents the OLS regression results where future patent counts scaled by 
contemporaneous R&D are regressed on contemporaneous government ownership, time varying 
firm level characteristics, and fixed effects.  In columns (1)-(3) we include country-year fixed 
effects, and industry-year fixed effects while in columns (4)-(6) we include year and firm fixed 
effects.  SOE is an indicator that firm i has a domestic sovereign owner in year t while GovStake 
is a continuous variable denoting the percent ownership of the domestic sovereign.  GovControl 
is an indicator that firm I has a domestic sovereign owner with at least a 50% ownership stake.  
Definitions for the firm characteristics can be found in the Variable Appendix.  Firm level 
characteristics are winsorized at the 1% and 99%.  Standard errors are clustered by firm.  The 
numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics.  ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical 
significance levels respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 
Countt+2/
RDt  
Countt+2/
RDt  
Countt+2/
RDt  
Countt+2/
RDt  
Countt+2/
RDt 
Countt+2/
RDt  
             
SOE i,t -0.110** -0.102** -0.110** -0.098* -0.116* -0.104* 
 (-2.16) (-2.08) (-2.18) (-1.74) (-1.88) (-1.82) 
GovStake i,t  -0.001   0.003*    (-0.47)   (1.76)  
GovControl i,t   -0.014   0.162** 
   (-0.11)   (2.44) 
Constrained i,t -0.099* -0.099* -0.099* -0.059 -0.059 -0.059 
 (-1.87) (-1.87) (-1.87) (-1.51) (-1.51) (-1.52) 
FinCrisis i,t 0.216*** 0.218*** 0.215*** 0.042 0.040 0.041 
 (2.96) (2.98) (2.96) (0.47) (0.45) (0.46) 
ROA i,t -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (-1.00) (-1.00) (-1.00) (1.10) (1.10) (1.10) 
PPE/TA i,t -0.161 -0.160 -0.161 -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 
 (-1.49) (-1.47) (-1.48) (-0.08) (-0.08) (-0.08) 
Debt/TA i,t 
-
0.382*** 
-
0.383*** 
-
0.382*** -0.406 -0.406 -0.406 
 (-3.45) (-3.45) (-3.45) (-1.23) (-1.23) (-1.23) 
CAPEX/TA i,t 0.588*** 0.586*** 0.587*** 0.197 0.197 0.195 
 (3.68) (3.68) (3.68) (0.90) (0.90) (0.89) 
Assets i,t 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* 
 (2.52) (2.51) (2.52) (-1.91) (-1.91) (-1.91) 
Constant -0.061 -0.061 -0.061 0.469*** 0.469*** 0.470*** 
 (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.39) (3.08) (3.08) (3.08) 
       
Observations 27,855 27,855 27,855 27,855 27,855 27,855 
SE Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
clusters 4,778 4,778 4,778 4,778 4,778 4,778 
Country x Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.00688 0.00685 0.00685 0.0597 0.0597 0.0597 
Table 8: Patent Output and Sovereign Ownership  
This table presents the OLS regression results where future patent counts are regressed on 
contemporaneous government ownership, time varying firm level characteristics, year fixed 
effects, and firm fixed effects.  SOE is an indicator that firm i has a domestic sovereign owner in 
year t while GovStake is a continuous variable denoting the percent ownership of the domestic 
sovereign.  GovControl is an indicator that firm I has a domestic sovereign owner with at least a 
50% ownership stake.  Definitions for the firm characteristics can be found in the Variable 
Appendix.  Firm level characteristics are winsorized at the 1% and 99%.  Standard errors are 
clustered by firm.  The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics.  ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, 
and 10% statistical significance levels respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables LnCountt+2  LnCountt+2  LnCountt+2  LnCountt+2  LnCountt+2  
            
SOE i,t -0.097*** -0.098*** -0.102*** -0.104*** -0.105*** 
 (-4.81) (-4.88) (-5.03) (-3.72) (-3.72) 
GovStake i,t  0.000  0.001    (0.17)  (0.48)  
GovControl i,t   0.141*  0.137 
   (1.72)  (1.47) 
SOE i,t x Constrained i,t    0.068* 0.072** 
    (1.92) (2.08) 
GovStake i,t x Constrained i,t    -0.001      (-0.50)  
GovControl i,t x Constrained i,t     -0.095 
     (-0.97) 
SOE i,t x FinCrisis i,t    -0.029 -0.045* 
    (-1.09) (-1.84) 
GovStake i,t x FinCrisis i,t    -0.004      (-1.47)  
GovControl i,t x FinCrisis i,t     0.091 
     (1.37) 
Constrained i,t -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.015 -0.015 
 (-0.86) (-0.86) (-0.87) (-1.17) (-1.20) 
FinCrisis i,t -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 0.003 0.002 
 (-0.28) (-0.30) (-0.38) (0.31) (0.20) 
ROA i,t 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 
 (1.97) (1.97) (1.97) (1.91) (1.91) 
PPE/TA i,t 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.021 0.022 
 (0.64) (0.64) (0.64) (0.57) (0.58) 
Debt/TA i,t -0.037 -0.037 -0.037 -0.036 -0.036 
 (-1.40) (-1.40) (-1.41) (-1.36) (-1.35) 
CAPEX/TA i,t 0.067 0.067 0.065 0.068 0.065 
 (1.29) (1.29) (1.26) (1.32) (1.27) 
Assets i,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.40) (-1.40) (-1.41) (-1.32) (-1.33) 
R&D/TA i,t -0.330** -0.330** -0.329** -0.332** -0.333** 
 (-2.10) (-2.10) (-2.09) (-2.11) (-2.12) 
Constant 0.360*** 0.360*** 0.360*** 0.362*** 0.362*** 
 (19.29) (19.29) (19.30) (19.23) (19.22) 
      
Observations 29,062 29,062 29,062 29,062 29,062 
SE Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
clusters 4,825 4,825 4,825 4,825 4,825 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.853 0.852 0.853 0.853 0.853 
  
Table 9: Patent Efficiency (Citations per Patent) and Sovereign Ownership  
This table presents the OLS regression results where future citation per patent quality measures 
scaled by contemporaneous R&D are regressed on contemporaneous government ownership, time 
varying firm level characteristics, country-year fixed effects, and industry-year fixed effects.   
SOE is an indicator that firm i has a domestic sovereign owner in year t while GovStake is a 
continuous variable denoting the percent ownership of the domestic sovereign.  GovControl is an 
indicator that firm I has a domestic sovereign owner with at least a 50% ownership stake.  
Definitions for the firm characteristics can be found in the Variable Appendix.  Firm level 
characteristics are winsorized at the 1% and 99%.  Standard errors are clustered by firm.  The 
numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics.  ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical 
significance levels respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables 
CpCt+2/ 
R&D i,t 
CpCt+2/ 
R&D i,t 
CpCt+2/ 
R&D i,t 
CpCt+2/ 
R&D i,t 
CpCt+2/ 
R&D i,t 
       
SOE i,t -37.094 -41.779 -38.687 -71.495 -63.673 
 (-0.83) (-0.83) (-0.83) (-0.89) (-0.90) 
GovStake i,t  0.531  1.057    (0.74)  (0.86)  
GovControl i,t   29.578  58.484 
   (0.69)  (0.89) 
SOE i,t x Constrained i,t    43.108 38.408 
    (1.31) (1.26) 
GovStake i,t x Constrained i,t    -1.148      (-0.79)  
GovControl i,t x Constrained i,t     -139.850 
     (-1.14) 
SOE i,t x FinCrisis i,t    45.165 39.667 
    (0.68) (0.67) 
GovStake i,t x FinCrisis i,t    -0.548      (-0.54)  
GovControl i,t x FinCrisis i,t     -25.432 
     (-0.52) 
Constrained i,t -52.070 -52.118 -52.100 -54.667 -54.537 
 (-0.91) (-0.91) (-0.91) (-0.93) (-0.93) 
FinCrisis i,t 37.944 36.331 38.850 28.699 31.482 
 (0.95) (0.96) (0.95) (1.11) (1.16) 
ROA i,t 0.052 0.054 0.053 0.042 0.041 
 (0.51) (0.54) (0.53) (0.39) (0.38) 
PPE/TA i,t -66.485 -67.254 -66.981 -67.846 -67.486 
 (-1.06) (-1.05) (-1.06) (-1.06) (-1.06) 
Debt/TA i,t -99.290 -98.883 -99.013 -98.691 -98.901 
 (-0.91) (-0.91) (-0.91) (-0.90) (-0.90) 
CAPEX/TA i,t -42.214 -41.439 -41.823 -40.615 -40.799 
 (-0.31) (-0.30) (-0.30) (-0.30) (-0.30) 
Assets i,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.22) (-1.22) (-1.22) (-1.20) (-1.20) 
Constant 93.986 94.160 94.096 96.267 96.093 
 (0.98) (0.98) (0.98) (0.99) (0.99) 
      
Observations 28,510 28,510 28,510 28,510 28,510 
SE Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
clusters 4,779 4,779 4,779 4,779 4,779 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared -0.00589 -0.00593 -0.00593 -0.00607 -0.00607 
Table 10: Market reaction to Patent News and Sovereign Ownership  
This table presents summary statistics from event studies around patent publication dates.  We examine the market adjusted returns for each firm 
before and after the public release of patent application information following the method introduced by Kogan et al. (2017).  We divide the firm 
events by SOE, the indicator that firm i has a domestic sovereign owner in year t, and present the results for non-sovereign owned enterprises in 
Panel A and sovereign owned enterprises in Panel B.  We formally test the difference in means for each event window in Panel C assuming 
unequal variance among the two populations.  The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics.  ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical 
significance levels respectively. 
Panel A – Non-SOE firms 
Days N 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Median 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Z 
p-
value 
       
(-1,+1) 63,120 0.10% 0.00% 7.389 <.0001 
(0,0) 63,115 0.03% 0.00% 4.239 <.0001 
(0,+1) 63,117 0.04% -0.02% 3.915 <.0001 
(-5,+5) 63,145 0.36% 0.18% 13.375 <.0001 
(-10,+10) 63,179 0.64% 0.41% 17.268 <.0001 
 
Panel C – Difference in Means 
Days Non-SOE SOE t Prob t 
(-1,+1) 0.10% 0.09% 0.417 0.676 
(0,0) 0.03% 0.04% -1.04 0.300 
(0,+1) 0.04% 0.07% -1.25 0.211 
(-5,+5) 0.36% 0.35% 0.194 0.846 
(-10,+10) 0.64% 0.67% -0.394 0.694 
 
Panel B – SOE firms 
Days N 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Median 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Z 
p-
value 
      
(-1,+1) 21,160 0.09% 0.04% 5.361 <.0001 
(0,0) 21,160 0.04% 0.00% 4.447 <.0001 
(0,+1) 21,160 0.07% 0.01% 5.118 <.0001 
(-5,+5) 21,160 0.35% 0.29% 10.838 <.0001 
(-10,+10) 21,162 0.67% 0.63% 15.057 <.0001 
Table 11: Sustainable Patent Output and Sovereign Ownership  
This table presents the OLS regression results where future sustainable patent counts are 
regressed on contemporaneous government ownership, time varying firm level characteristics, 
year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects.  SOE is an indicator that firm i has a domestic sovereign 
owner in year t while GovStake is a continuous variable denoting the percent ownership of the 
domestic sovereign.  GovControl is an indicator that firm I has a domestic sovereign owner with 
at least a 50% ownership stake.  Definitions for the firm characteristics can be found in the 
Variable Appendix.  Firm level characteristics are winsorized at the 1% and 99%.  Standard 
errors are clustered by firm.  The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics.  ***, **, and * represent 
1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables LnSusCtt+2  LnSusCtt+2  LnSusCtt+2  LnSusCtt+2  LnSusCtt+2  
            
SOE i,t -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (-0.42) (-0.90) (-0.43) (-0.56) (-0.08) 
GovStake i,t  0.000  0.000    (1.17)  (1.07)  
GovControl i,t   0.000  0.000 
   (0.59)  (0.09) 
SOE i,t x Constrained i,t    0.001 0.001 
    (1.30) (0.95) 
GovStake i,t x Constrained i,t    -0.000      (-1.20)  
GovControl i,t x Constrained i,t     -0.000 
     (-0.50) 
SOE i,t x FinCrisis i,t    -0.001 -0.001* 
    (-1.60) (-1.71) 
GovStake i,t x FinCrisis i,t    0.000      (0.05)  
GovControl i,t x FinCrisis i,t     0.001** 
     (2.18) 
Constrained i,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* 
 (-1.47) (-1.48) (-1.47) (-1.90) (-1.79) 
FinCrisis i,t -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.99) (-1.05) (-0.99) (-0.91) (-0.77) 
ROA i,t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
PPE/TA i,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.23) (-0.24) (-0.23) (-0.28) (-0.28) 
Debt/TA i,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.53) (-0.53) (-0.53) (-0.49) (-0.48) 
CAPEX/TA i,t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Assets i,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.05) (-1.07) (-1.05) (-1.00) (-0.99) 
R&D/TA i,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.02) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.03) (-0.03) 
Constant 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.33) (1.33) (1.33) (1.37) (1.36) 
      
Observations 28,825 28,825 28,825 28,825 28,825 
SE Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
clusters 4,788 4,788 4,788 4,788 4,788 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0526 0.0526 0.0526 0.0526 0.0525 
Appendix  
 
 
 
Figure A1: Patent Office Specific Citation Adjustment Factors 
We graph the first five lags of patent citation adjustment factors for various patent offices using 
data from 1976-1985 to generate average citation lag adjustment factors by Patent Office-Industry 
section-lag.  The graph above shows various adjustment factors for the IPC section A: Human 
Necessities at various patent offices.  
  
Table A1: Aggregate Citation Adjustment 
This table presents average citation adjustment factors for patents granted from the European 
Patent Convention (EPC) member offices.  Following the spirit of Hall et al. (2000) we report the 
adjustment factor for 29 lags across the 8 Industrial Patent Classification (IPC) codes reported by 
the EPO. 
  IPC Section 
   A B C D E F G H 
Lag 0 60.465 43.668 32.393 33.313 50.019 31.989 30.936 31.754 
 1 26.131 18.954 14.237 14.642 21.693 14.771 13.823 14.119 
 2 16.226 11.776 9.008 9.320 13.529 9.564 8.745 8.971 
 3 11.796 8.593 6.724 7.039 9.878 7.211 6.480 6.659 
 4 9.289 6.807 5.433 5.710 7.851 5.877 5.202 5.363 
 5 7.675 5.658 4.598 4.863 6.503 5.007 4.387 4.524 
 6 6.539 4.851 4.015 4.238 5.571 4.389 3.812 3.942 
 7 5.673 4.258 3.580 3.761 4.885 3.920 3.391 3.509 
 8 5.005 3.796 3.239 3.392 4.336 3.552 3.066 3.176 
 9 4.465 3.428 2.964 3.087 3.905 3.259 2.803 2.907 
 10 4.014 3.125 2.729 2.829 3.558 3.009 2.583 2.682 
 11 3.639 2.871 2.531 2.609 3.265 2.798 2.400 2.492 
 12 3.320 2.651 2.362 2.418 3.012 2.616 2.244 2.330 
 13 3.051 2.464 2.219 2.261 2.792 2.459 2.111 2.189 
 14 2.817 2.303 2.094 2.125 2.600 2.317 1.996 2.065 
 15 2.613 2.161 1.982 2.000 2.434 2.191 1.893 1.953 
 16 2.430 2.032 1.882 1.886 2.282 2.076 1.800 1.850 
 17 2.260 1.913 1.786 1.782 2.142 1.969 1.711 1.755 
 18 2.096 1.800 1.695 1.681 2.003 1.863 1.627 1.664 
 19 1.941 1.691 1.606 1.585 1.869 1.760 1.545 1.576 
 20 1.800 1.589 1.523 1.500 1.746 1.660 1.467 1.494 
 21 1.670 1.496 1.444 1.421 1.632 1.563 1.395 1.417 
 22 1.550 1.410 1.371 1.346 1.525 1.473 1.327 1.346 
 23 1.441 1.331 1.302 1.277 1.426 1.386 1.264 1.280 
 24 1.342 1.259 1.237 1.216 1.334 1.305 1.207 1.220 
 25 1.252 1.193 1.178 1.160 1.249 1.229 1.154 1.164 
 26 1.173 1.133 1.123 1.109 1.174 1.160 1.107 1.114 
 27 1.104 1.081 1.075 1.066 1.107 1.098 1.065 1.070 
 28 1.047 1.037 1.034 1.030 1.048 1.045 1.030 1.032 
 29 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  
Table A2: Citation lag adjustment by patent office for IPC section A: Human Necessities 
This table presents citation adjustment factors for individual patent offices adhering to the European Patent Convention (EPC) for one Industrial 
Patent Code class (A).  Following the spirit of Hall et al. (2000) we report the adjustment factor for 29 lags. 
            Patent Office 
   AU AT BE CA CH DE DD ES FR GB JP SU US 
Lag 0 23.379 53.763 20.646 112.82 77.187 38.131 61.373 210.85 24.295 142.69 8.693 198.44 62.686 
 1 11.659 13.998 6.052 27.323 20.038 12.152 17.255 46.903 9.748 29.698 4.266 34.694 27.526 
 2 6.897 7.316 4.035 13.893 10.556 7.161 9.255 29.066 6.207 16.232 2.935 15.890 17.196 
 3 4.684 4.819 3.347 9.248 6.987 5.255 6.041 21.117 4.733 10.906 2.338 9.872 12.510 
 4 3.586 3.587 2.871 6.613 5.272 4.230 4.875 17.972 3.761 8.057 1.974 6.897 9.863 
 5 2.917 2.913 2.570 5.160 4.269 3.545 3.924 14.846 3.142 6.183 1.745 5.384 8.157 
 6 2.407 2.499 2.324 4.198 3.561 3.063 3.350 8.999 2.716 4.905 1.590 4.351 6.957 
 7 2.093 2.190 2.151 3.598 3.066 2.714 2.891 6.360 2.532 3.940 1.479 3.652 6.035 
 8 1.858 1.946 2.023 3.161 2.699 2.454 2.562 5.237 2.326 3.416 1.405 3.143 5.318 
 9 1.637 1.758 1.909 2.737 2.424 2.226 2.364 3.779 2.084 2.941 1.351 2.729 4.738 
 10 1.527 1.644 1.807 2.430 2.220 2.062 2.186 3.093 1.958 2.623 1.313 2.403 4.250 
 11 1.445 1.542 1.722 2.185 2.049 1.916 2.015 2.708 1.846 2.388 1.282 2.155 3.843 
 12 1.386 1.459 1.651 2.005 1.877 1.794 1.869 2.370 1.749 2.206 1.262 1.969 3.497 
 13 1.315 1.395 1.579 1.827 1.734 1.691 1.758 2.139 1.676 2.062 1.248 1.810 3.204 
 14 1.275 1.339 1.516 1.702 1.632 1.598 1.661 1.946 1.608 1.935 1.236 1.680 2.950 
 15 1.235 1.291 1.451 1.592 1.540 1.521 1.563 1.809 1.561 1.838 1.226 1.573 2.728 
 16 1.203 1.261 1.402 1.496 1.467 1.453 1.503 1.693 1.490 1.719 1.217 1.481 2.529 
 17 1.174 1.228 1.356 1.423 1.400 1.395 1.440 1.589 1.456 1.608 1.208 1.407 2.344 
 18 1.153 1.199 1.316 1.357 1.341 1.340 1.397 1.510 1.431 1.516 1.197 1.341 2.167 
 19 1.141 1.174 1.269 1.304 1.294 1.291 1.342 1.417 1.375 1.444 1.187 1.290 1.999 
 20 1.129 1.149 1.234 1.261 1.236 1.243 1.304 1.344 1.324 1.391 1.176 1.250 1.848 
 21 1.110 1.130 1.197 1.219 1.199 1.209 1.263 1.290 1.276 1.324 1.162 1.212 1.708 
 22 1.096 1.113 1.168 1.182 1.167 1.179 1.224 1.243 1.247 1.276 1.146 1.180 1.580 
 23 1.084 1.099 1.133 1.152 1.135 1.150 1.191 1.209 1.207 1.238 1.130 1.155 1.465 
 24 1.069 1.085 1.107 1.119 1.106 1.124 1.155 1.162 1.163 1.205 1.111 1.129 1.359 
 25 1.054 1.066 1.081 1.090 1.080 1.097 1.110 1.121 1.128 1.168 1.091 1.106 1.265 
 26 1.041 1.048 1.055 1.066 1.063 1.071 1.081 1.091 1.085 1.136 1.070 1.076 1.180 
 27 1.028 1.026 1.033 1.045 1.037 1.046 1.053 1.058 1.048 1.100 1.047 1.047 1.108 
 28 1.015 1.015 1.012 1.020 1.018 1.021 1.024 1.024 1.016 1.052 1.023 1.024 1.049 
 29 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
  
Table A3: CPC sustainable patent tagging scheme 
This table lists the Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC) sub-groups created by the EPO to tag 
sustainable technologies.  Each sub-group was devised in coordination with field experts using 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change.  For more information see https://www.epo.org/news-
issues/issues/classification/classification.html 
Sub-group Description Comment 
Y02B Climate change mitigation 
technologies related to buildings, 
including housing and 
appliances or related end-user 
applications  
Integration of renewables in buildings, lighting, 
HVAC (heating, ventilation and air 
conditioning), home appliances, elevators and 
scalators, constructional or architectural 
elements, ICT, power management 
Y02C Capture, storage, sequestration 
or disposal of greenhouse gases 
(GHG).  
CO2 capture and storage, also of other relevant 
GHG 
Y02E Climate change mitigation 
technologies in energy 
generation, transmission and 
distribution  
Renewable energy, efficient combustion, nuclear 
energy, biofuels, efficient transmission and 
distribution, energy storage, hydrogen 
technology 
Y02P Climate change mitigation 
technologies in the production or 
processing of goods  
Metal processing, chemical/petrochemical 
industry, minerals processing (e.g. cement, lime, 
glass), agroalimentary industries, 
Y02T Climate change mitigation 
technologies related to 
transportation  
e-mobility, hybrid cars, efficient internal 
combustion engines, efficient technologies in 
railways and air/waterways transport 
Y04S Smart grid technologies  Power networks operation, end-user applications 
management, smart metering, electric and hybrid 
vehicles interoperability, trading and marketing 
aspects 
 
  
Table A4: Patent Offices of Publication 
Patent Office Abbreviation 
Albania AL 
Austria AT 
Bosnia and Herzegovina BA 
Belgium BE 
Bulgaria BG 
Croatia HR 
Cyprus CY 
Czech Republic CZ 
Denmark DK 
Estonia EE 
European Patent Office EP 
Finland FI 
France FR 
Germany DE 
Georgia GE 
Greece GR 
Hungary HU 
Iceland IS 
Ireland IE 
Italy IT 
Latvia LV 
Liechtenstein LI 
Lithuania LT 
Luxembourg LU 
Malta MT 
Monaco MC 
Montenegro ME 
Netherlands NL 
Norway NO 
Poland PL 
Portugal PT 
Romania RO 
San Marino SM 
Serbia RS 
Slovakia SK 
Slovenia SI 
Spain ES 
Sweden SE 
Switzerland CH 
United Kingdom GB 
 
 
  
Table A5: R&D/TA (IV First Stage) from Table 5 
R&D expenditures 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables SOE i,t GovStakei,t GovControl i,t 
     
CivilLaw j,t 0.059*** 0.483*** 0.002* 
 (14.19) (5.10) (1.67) 
Investment j,t -0.013*** -0.023 0.000 
 (-21.44) (-1.60) (0.27) 
Unemployment j,t 0.001* 0.022 0.000 
 (1.68) (1.34) (1.27) 
LeftWing j,t -0.034*** -0.398*** -0.002 
 (-9.00) (-4.82) (-1.56) 
Constrained i,t -0.071*** -0.438*** -0.002*** 
 (-22.70) (-9.34) (-4.64) 
FinCrisis i,t -0.116*** -0.694*** -0.006** 
 (-12.87) (-4.10) (-2.48) 
ROA i,t 0.000*** -0.002*** -0.000*** 
 (7.35) (-2.94) (-4.88) 
PPE/TA i,t 0.009 1.761*** 0.020*** 
 (1.24) (8.87) (7.56) 
Debt/TA i,t -0.041*** -1.070*** -0.011*** 
 (-5.34) (-7.12) (-5.92) 
CAPEX/TA i,t 0.019 -1.266* -0.015* 
 (0.81) (-1.95) (-1.94) 
Assets i,t 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (12.08) (5.29) (3.37) 
R&D/TA I,t 0.300*** 0.601** -0.002 
 (10.06) (2.43) (-0.82) 
Constant 0.306*** 0.252 -0.005 
 (18.56) (0.80) (-1.52) 
    
Observations 33,726 33,726 33,726 
SE Robust Robust Robust 
Country x Year FE No No No 
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
